Ah�·tract-This paper presents a novel methodology for the HWISW co-design of fault tolerant emhedded systems that pursues the mitigation of radiation-induced upset events (which are a class of Single Event EITecto; -SEEs) on critical industrial applications. The proposal comhines the flexihility and low cost of Software Implemented Hardware Fault To lerance (SIHFT) techniques with the high reliahility of selective hardware repli cation. The co-design flow is supported hy a hardening platform that comprises an automatic software hardening em'ironment and a hardware tool ahle to emulate Single Event Upsets (SEUs). As a case study. we selected a soft-micro (PicoBiaze) widely used in FPGA-hased industrial systems. and a fault tolerant version of the matrix I1l11ltip!imtion algorithm was developed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Currently. it is a fact that electronic components are more sensitive to Single or Multiple Event Effects induced hy radiation due to its progressive miniaturization [11 [2] . These effects can cause catastrophic consequences in critical indus trial applications whose operation take place under harsh envi ronments where there are present ionizing radiation particles.
Although these radiation-induced upset events are commonly found in the space environment. they are also present in a lower measure in the atmospheric environment [3 J ensuring an acceptahle level of reliahility.
Since most hardening strategies (hased on HW or SW redun dancy) are designed to he applied in the handling of a wide set of appl ications without look after each constraint of the application. these lead to high costs. increase the development time and rise the performance and code overheads.
In this context. we propose the application-driven HWISW co-design to achieve a customized fault tolerant version of the system that met the requirements of the application (fault coverage level. costs. execution time. memory size .... ) .
The co-design flow is supported hy a hardening platform.
which is aimed to develop and evaluate fault tolerant em hedded systems. This platform allows an easy design space exploration. taking advantage of the hest of hoth worlds: the low cost of the software techniques and the high reliahility of hardware redundancy. It is made up of a software hardening tool and a hardware SEU emulation tool. The first one is hased on a generic and extensihle architecture that allows handling multiple microprocessor targets and performs au tomatic source code transformations at low instruction level (assemhler). The second one. hased on FPGAs. permits to assess several reliahility metrics of the overall system and identify the SEU-critical areas that must he hardened. By emulating SEUs at hardware level. it is possihle to ohtain more accurate results than hy using simulation techniques. As the hardware emulation considers faults in hidden registers such as those ones in pipeline.
The Pi('oB l a�e soft-micro was selected as test vehicle to work with. By the software side, a hasic application of matrix mu l tip l ication was chosen. Thanks to their simplicity it was possihle to fully understand the prohlem and to he prepared to use our tools suhsequently to more powerful :i2-hits architectures.
Next section presents the application-driven co-design flow.
Section III descrihes the hardening platform. Section IV includes a case study applying the presented methodology.
Section V presents the experiments and their results. finally.
Section VI concludes the paper and suggests directions for future research.
II. ApP LICATION-DRIVEN CO-DESIGN OF FAULT TOLERANT SYSTEMS
The first step of our design methodology is the derivation of a set of system requirements from the point of view of the embedded application. Such requirements can be di rectly a system constraint or may target any kind of fault tolerance metric associated to a specific application. System constraints generally are related to silicon area, performance, power consumption and costs; whereas, fault tolerance metrics are concerned with fault coverage (Fe), detection fault rate, recovery time, overheads, etc. These requirements feed into the generation of a test bench to guide the co-design of the system where constraints and fault tolerance metrics motivate design decisions. The incremental adoption of SIHFT tech niques can then determine a set of suitable implementations of the software side of the system. Following, fault injection campaigns are performed to evaluate Fe and identify critical system regions. The solution is not necessarily a single point in the design space but may result in a range of trade-offs.
The proposed co-design flow can be summarized as follows:
1) The specific requirements of the application (constraints and fault tolerance metrics) are fully defined. 2) Several SIHFT techniques are applied incrementally to obtain n candidate implementations of the software. 3) Each candidate implementation is evaluated to estimate its overhead comparing with the original program, in terms of code and execution time. 4) All solutions that met the maximum overheads specified are selected to run on the original microprocessor. 5) Using our SEU emulation tool, an overall fault injection campaign is performed to estimate the Fe provided for each candidate running on the microprocessor system. 6) For the selected ones, an exhaustive fault injection campaign is carried out in order to identify the SEU critical flip-flops that are not protected by the SIHFT techniques.
7)
Hardware redundancy is applied to those identified SEU critical flip-flops using different criteria depending on the reliability requirements of the application.
The result is a set of HWISW configurations that achieve an optimized fault tolerant version of the system.
III. HARDENING PLATFORM
The platform that supports the proposed methodology com prises two suites of tools that follow the different nature of the two main steps in the co-design process, a software hardening development environment and a hardware tool for the evaluation of the robustness of the whole system.
A. Hardening Development Environment
We propose the use of a generic architecture to implement the hardening tasks. This architecture is useful to provide a uniform hardening core compatible with usual microproces sors by means of automatic code transformations. Therefore, to provide all the needed tools to implement and evaluate SIHFT techniques, we propose the scheme showed in Fig. 1 .
Compiler front·ends
Compiler back ends
The compiler front-ends take the original source code from a supported architecture, perform lexical, syntactical and se mantic analyses, and finally generate a Generic Instruction Flow (GenInsFlow) as output. This flow represents a high level abstraction of a program that allows a platform independent implementation of the hardening routines (in the hardener). After the hardening process, the hardener produces a hardened GenInsFlow, which is taken by the selected compiler back-end to generate the hardened source code for the selected spe cific architecture. The hardening environment includes several functionalities that are common to the state-of-the-art SIHFT techniques: insertion of code, compile-time transformations, control flow analysis, management of architecture's resources, etc.
As better results are reported when low level instruction redundancy is applied, the hardening environment is conceived to perform code transformations at low level (assembler).
U sing this scheme, the environment is prepared to take a code written for a supported architecture, perform its compilation and generic hardening, and finally, generate the output of the hardened source code targeting the same original architecture or to a different one by means of the back-ends.
Moreover, it is worth to mention that the software tools which comprise the hardening development environment are multi platform, and have been successfully tested in Debian GNUILinux (Kernel 2.6.30) and Windows XP SP3lVista. 1) Generic Architecture: We took into account three top ics to develop the generic architecture: generic instructions, memory management and control flow graph. a) Generic Instruction: The generic architecture is de fined by means of generic instructions. Each generic instruc tion is composed of the following fields.
Address. Memory address where the instruction has been assembled by the compiler front-end.
Mnemonic. Original mnemonic of the instruction. Generic Operator List. Generic operators present at the instruction. Each operator is a member of the list and each one has three fields, they are: operator type, addressing mode and real name. The Operator Type defines the kind of operator, such as: Register, Literal, Address or Flag. The Addressing Mode can be: Absolute, Register Indirect, Immediate Literal, among others. Finally, the Real Name is the operator's original name.
Affected Generic Flag List. Generic flags affected by the execution of the instruction. Each generic flag is composed of a type and a name. The Generic Flag Type can be: Zero, Carry, Interrupt Enable, etc. The Real Name is the original flag name of the target architecture.
Instruction Type. This is used to classify the instructions. It is very important because the hardening process depends on this type. For example, it is different to handle an arithmetic instruction and a control flow instruction during hardening. Some of the supported types are: interrupt, directive, control flow, arithmetic, logic, storage, input/output and shift/rotate.
Tool Message. This is a log the environment tools use to register events. b) Memory Management: A common task for the SIHFT techniques is the insertion of instructions into the original code during compilation time. Therefore, it is necessary to supply the following memory management means within the hardener tool: identification of the memory map, extraction of the code sections and memory map update. The following three possibilities were developed to update the memory map: dilation, displacement and reallocation.
Dilation. When one or more instructions are inserted into a memory section, it grows and the affected instructions addresses should be reassigned.
Displacement. If some instructions are inserted into a previ ous memory section, it is possible having an overlapping with the following section. Then this section must be completely moved, updating all its instructions addresses.
Reallocation. If there is a memory overflow caused by previous instructions insertions, then it is needed to perform a complete reallocation of all memory sections. During this process, free memory space among memory sections is fully used. This situation may happen because of the reduced memory size in embedded systems. c) Control Flow Graph: The generic architecture allows identifying the control flow graph from a given GenInsFlow. This graph is the key for most SIHFT techniques.
The control flow graph is represented by a directed graph. In order to build it, first we must identify the program's basic blocks. A basic block is a group of instructions that are executed sequentially, without any jump instruction nor function call, excepting possibly the last instruction. Also, a basic block does not contain instructions being the destination of a call or jump instruction, excepting the first instruction. Each basic block represents a node in the graph. The control flow changes are represented in the graph as links among the nodes. Fig. 2 shows an example of a control flow graph.
Additionally, as it was proposed by Reis et al. [13] , only the store instructions ultimately send data out of the logical domain of redundant execution. Then it is necessary to perform special verification before the execution of these instructions. Therefore, in this paper we propose that the nodes (basic blocks) of the control flow graph should be subdivided into subnodes after each store instruction (Fig. 3) 
--method. Selects the SIHFT technique to be applied.
--mcpu. Target microprocessor to generate the output.
--replicationRegisterLevel. Defines the register redundancy level, such as: 0 -minimum redundancy level, for example in the instruction ADD sO, s 1 only the register sO is copied; 1 -every register has a copy, for example in the instruction showed above, registers s 0 and s 1 will be copied.
--replicationTimes. Defines the number of copies of each redundant instruction (0 -none, 1 -duplicate, 2 -triplicate).
--voter. Used to define voter and recovery routines.
--NOlookAheadAvailableRegs. Disable the advanced registers search. This is an optimization that consists of finding available registers for replication purposes looking forward than the current node along the control flow graph.
b) Instruction Set Simulator -ISS: This tool simulates the GenInsFlow. It presents information about the state of the resources of the architecture during and after the simulation process.
Likewise, the ISS allows verifying if the functionality of the hardened programs matches the original non-hardened programs functionality. This is possible by means of the check-hardening option that use information stored in the source code through a compiler pragma to know which the expected results are.
After the simulation process, the ISS presents a brief sum mary to inform the code and execution time overheads of the applied hardening technique. Also, it performs a characteriza tion of the simulated programs, informing the percentage of executed instructions by its type: arithmetic, logical, control flow, etc.
B. SEU Emulation Tool -FT-Unshades
The FT-Unshades system, described in [14] , is a FPGA based platform for the study of digital circuit reliability against radiation-induced soft errors. SEU affecting the circuit are emulated by inducing bit-flips in the circuit under study, by means of partial reconfiguration.
The system is composed of a FPGA emulation board and a suite of software tools for design preparation, testing of the emulated design, and analysis of the test results. The main software of the suite is the FT-Unshades Test aNalysis Tools (TNT ) program, which manages the communications with the board, the partial reconfiguration and the test campaign execution.
In the original version of FT-Unshades, two instances of the circuit or module under test (MUT ) are instantiated in the implemented design: Target and Gold. Faults are injected over the Target instance, whereas the Gold instance remains unchanged for comparison purposes.
The system has been extended for the study of microproces sor architectures. An exhaustive description of this extension can be found in [15] . Instead of two instances of the MUT (Gold and Target), the implemented design has just one instance of the MUT (Target), and the Golden instance is substituted by a Smart Table (see Fig. 4 ). This is needed because the typical cycle-by-cycle comparison would classify as output error the etlect of faults that could be corrected if the Target microprocessor was given more processing time. The exact additional time, measured in clock cycles, which the atlected microprocessor needs to output the correct value is called recovery time.
The Smart Table is an automaton which implements the relaxed time restrictions needed for the fault injection testing of microprocessors that implement SIHFT techniques.
The Smart Table can be configured in emulation-time (this is, after synthesis, implementation and FPGA programming). First, the Smart Table must be configured with the outputs of a Golden Run of the Target microprocessor. This means a whole emulation of the circuit processing workload is done, but without injecting any bit-flips. When being configured during a Golden Run, the Smart Table not only memorizes the sequence of the correct outputs, but also the time (in clock cycles) where the outputs change.
After filling the Smart Table with the [expectedOutput, expectedCyclel duplets, the most important parameter the user must configure is the critical recovery time (Tcrit), which is the maximum recovery time allowed for the microprocessor. This means that if the microprocessor outputs the correct value in expectedCycle + Tcrit cycles, the fault is classified as producing no damage. But if expectedCycle + Tcrit + 1 clock cycles have passed and the microprocessor has not output any Fig. 4 . FT-Unshades implementation approach using Smart Table value yet, the Smart Table classifies the fault as producing timeout. Note that, since the emulation stops at this moment, timeout can mean either that the program execution has frozen, or that the damage is so bad that the hardening technique cannot recover the correct values after Tcrit + 1. Since we want to relax the time restrictions of the test, but we want the output data sequence to be correct, if the microprocessor outputs a wrong value (Output != expectedOutput) before expectedCycle + Tcrit + 1, the fault is classified as producing output damage.
IV. CASE STUDY
As a case study, it is presented the co-design of a hardened version of the matrix multiplication algorithm in the PicoBlaze soft-micro [16] .
A. PicoBlaze
This is an 8 bit soft-micro widely used in FPGA-based embedded systems. It supports the following main features: 15 byte-wide general-purpose data registers, lK instructions of programmable on-chip program store, Byte-wide Arithmetic Logic Unit (ALU) with CARRY and ZERO indicator flags and 54-byte internal scratchpad RAM.
In order to transform PicoBlaze code with our software hardening environment, a compiler front-end and back-end were developed.
The PicoBlaze front-end for takes the original KCPSM3 source code, performs lexical, syntactical and semantic anal yses, and finally generates a GenlnsFlow as output. This is a multiplatform compiler front-end that provides a very accurate error localization, compared with any other PicoBlaze compilers (including the official KCPSM3 compiler).
After the hardening process (performed by the hardener), it is produced a hardened GenlnsFlow, which is taken by the developed compiler back-end for PicoBlaze, transforming the flow back to the KCPSM3 syntax.
B. SIHFT Fault Tolerance Techniques
Since matrix multiplication algorithm is highly comprised of arithmetic and logic instructions, several SIHFT techniques (detection and recover) aimed to protect those instruction types were implemented. These techniques are based on the well known Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) approach.
First implemented strategy (TMR1) can be summarized as follows.
1) Identification of nodes (basic blocks) and subnodes in the program. 2) Build the control flow graph of the program. 3) Triplication of the operation. 4) Insertion of majority voters and recovery procedures for protected registers at the following points: just before the last instruction of each node/subnode and also, just before any instruction being the destination of a jump or function call. 5) During the hardening process, majorIty voters and re covery procedures are dynamically injected when there are not enough available registers to replicate. By means of this, registers copies will be released to continue with the hardening process.
Second implemented strategy (TMR2) consists in detect and correct faults in the program data by computing the values twice and recomputing a third time if a discrepancy between the first two values occurs. Fig. 5 shows an example of the hardening of a simple program (KCPSM3 syntax) using TMRI and TMR2 applied to arithmetic instructions. For the remaining of the paper, we will call arithTMRl to the technique used when the first hardening strategy (TMRl) is applied to arithmetic instructions. When applied to logic instructions, it will be named logicTMRl. So, if it is applied to both arithmetic and logic instructions, it will be named arithTMRl +logicTMRl. This naming scheme also applies when using the second hardening strategy (TMR2).
V. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
Firstly, the requirements of the application must be defined in terms of performance constraints and reliability metrics. For instance, when it is considered an application whose time response is critical, the maximum execution time overhead has to be defined as appropriate, whereas other applications could be more restrictive in other aspects as reliability.
The original version of the matrix multiplication (mmult) algorithm was written using the KCPSM3 syntax. The original program can be automatically transformed, us ing the hardening environment, by applying six SIHFT techniques (arithTMRl, arithTMR2, logicTMR, logicTMR2, arithTMRl+logicTMRl, arithTMR2 + logicTMR2). The func tionality of each hardened version is checked using the ISS, assuring that it is equivalent to the original non-hardened program functionality. After this, using the ISS as well, the code and execution time overheads can be obtained for each hardened version comparing them with the original program. Table I presents results for mmult. The overheads analyses can motivate important design de cisions, e.g. as the arithTMRl +logicTMRl approach causes unsuitable overheads for a particular application of the mmult algorithm, this hardened version could be discarded for further analyses.
In order to continue with the process, it is necessary to implement the hardware of the system to be tested within the FT-Unshades SEU emulation tool. After this, a fault injection campaign is prepared and executed for the whole system. In our case study, the hardware was implemented with the official Xilinx PicoBlaze netlist and it was designed a test campaign with following features:
• The emulated design is RTL-equivalent to the final hard ware.
• Random injection of SEU in a target bit chosen from all sixteen 8-bit registers (from sO to sF) and flags (zero and carry).
• To tal number of injected SEUs: 13.000 (one per run).
• The clock cycle for the SEU injection was randomly selected from all the workload duration.
• Tcrit was defined as 10 clock cycles, giving to the microprocessor 10 more clock cycles than the usual time usual to recover the system to a fault-free state.
Ta ble II shows the FC results obtained for each version of the system, including the non-hardened one. Results have been classified according to the effects caused in the program due to injected fault as: correct results, when despite the fault, the expected results are obtained; incorrect results, either when wrong results are obtained due to the fault or if the fault causes an infinite loop in the execution of the program.
FC results jointly with overheads results must be taken into account in the next decisions about system design. As it can be seen, the combination of arith and logic versions does not produce a better coverage than each approach by its self. It could be possible that the system constraints and fault tolerance minimums were already fulfilled by some SIHFT version; otherwise hardware redundancy must be applied. For example, if execution time is critical, the logicTMR2 approach can be selected for further fault coverage improvements. On the contrary, if code size is a restriction, arithTMR2 and logicTMR2 could be selected. In our case, logicTMRl was selected because it offers the highest FC and acceptable overheads.
Afterwards, it must to be prepared an exhaustive fault injection campaign for the chosen approach(es). This time the test campaign was performed emulating 100 SEUs for each bit from the target (sixteen 8-bit registers and flags), one SEU per run in a randomly selected clock cycle. Notice that this experiment is a really exhaustive test campaign because all possible memory cells are tested in 100 ditlerent times. The majority of the injection campaigns related in the literature usually performs SEU injections in the order of 10 2 from all the architecture registers, whereas we injected in the order of 10 3 for the defined target. Focusing in the logicTMRl approach, the Fig. 6 presents the percentage of failure behavior caused by the target bits (flip-flops) when a SEU had atlected them.
Fig. 6. SEU-critical flip-flops on target for logicTMRl
These results are useful to identify the SEU-critical bits in the system, that are not protected by the SlHFT technique and should be hardened using hardware redundancy. It is worth mention that hardware redundancy has a minimum associated cost of x 3,2 (triplication of resources plus voter). Therefore, if there is a cost area constraint and it is not possible to apply hardware redundancy to all of the SEU-critical identified flip flops, they must to be prioritized according to which one has a higher probability to provoke an undesired behavior of the system. For instance, the selected flip-flops will be those ones whose failure percentage is above a predefined threshold (in this case 15%).
Finally, after applying the hardware redundancy to the selected flip-flops, it is expected to end up with a HW/SW system configuration (or more) that satisfies the reliability requirements of the studied application.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have presented a new methodology for the co-design of fault tolerant industrial systems affected by radiation-induced upset events. It is based on a guided co design flow that able the designer to apply hardware and software hardening methods obtaining the best trade-off taking into account the requirements of a specific application (cost, performance, overheads, Fe level, ... ). This methodology is supported by a hardening platform that allows a quick space design exploration to reach the requirements. The platform comprises a SlHFT development environment and a hardware SEU emulation tool. In order to confirm the feasibility of our proposal, a case study has been considered to the hardening of matrix multiplication algorithm in the PicoBlaze soft-micro.
The SlHFT development environment will be extended for being used with more advanced microprocessors to take advan tage of the generic architecture which the generic hardening core is based on. and 'Aceleraci6n hardware de algoritmos industriales para el sector calzado' (GRE 0 8 -P 11) (University of Alicante).
